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Bringing Union to Textiles 
Factors Which Aided and  Impeded the Progress of 
Unionism in the North Carolina Textile  Industry 
From the momentum engendered by the Cotton Mill 
Campaign of the  l8§80's  to the creation of Burlington  In- 
dustries in 1955 the history of cotton textiles has been one 
of major achievement in capitalization from meager financial 
resources,   of erratic and then  systematic  integration of small, 
independently owned and  operated family mills  into the indus- 
trial and managerial complex  of the world's  largest textile 
establishments.  Corresponding with the physical growth of 
plants and  productive capacity was  the  steady deterioration 
of the original  community of interest between textile  oper- 
ator and textile operative and  the  formation of the  first 
native American proletariat.   The emergence  of this  class 
and its realization  of the collective power which it pos- 
sessed,  coupled with the relatively rapid consolidation of 
the textile industry,  led to a  repetition on Southern  soil 
of the chrbnicle of the coming of age of American labor, 
this time  in its relation to the organized  capital  of the 
Southern textile industry. 
Coming upon the American economic  scene relatively 
late,  the  establishment of textile unionism in North Caro- 
lina displayed many of the characteristics of earlier union 
organizations.  In its battle for recognition and eventual 
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acceptance,   North Carolina textile unionism passed through 
some of the  growing pains common to all American unionizing 
movements.  During the years 1935 to i960 North Carolina 
textile labor as a viable force demonstrated its kinship to 
the American labor movement as in almost precisely the same 
instances it revealed its particularly local manifestations. 
It is in these two almost paradoxical fac#+S of the person- 
ality of organized labor that the strengths and flaws of 
Southern textile unionism are most clearly revealed—and 
this revelation bodes well, and—also paradoxically—, ill 
at the same time  for the future  of organized labor in the 
Southland. 
It is not  by accident  that the textile industry Is 
selected in order to show the peculiarities of Southern 
labor, for in this comparatively elementary form of manu- 
facturing the  lines of conflict  between the opposing forces 
of labor and management are most clearly and tangibly drawn. 
In this,   the  oldest form of mass manufacturing in the South, 
all the elements  of a purely   regional development  (both on 
the part  of the operator and   in  the realm of a burgeoning 
labor movement)  are distinctly outlined.  The  factors  produc- 
ing the obvious delineations  between  opposing forces and 
thus the  "model"  for  examination are manifold:  the com- 
parative age  of the  industry which enables It to display 
changing currents  of development;   the relative  simplicity 
of the cotton manufacturing process;   the wholly Southern 
character of the  inception of the venture;   the fact  that 
native-b.tn elements entirely predominated    in both workers 
and managerial personnel; and the final qualification that 
throughout its history the Southern cotton textile indus- 
try has been overwhelmingly interrelated with the  other 
processes—economic,   social,  and  political—of the whole 
of Southern life. 
In order to  evaluate the impact of unionism on the 
North Carolina textile industry a k: owledge of the outstand- 
ing characteristics of both operators and operatives is of 
paramount importance.   In addition,  an appraisal of the 
efforts at bringing the union to North Carolina textiles in 
the era before 1935 adds  scope and perspective to any chroni- 
cle of the developments  of later decades.  Such examinations 
of background material and,   indeed,   the great bulk of this 
study deal primarily with developments in the state  of North 
Carolina because  it is in the Tar Heel State  that many of 
the significant mileposts of textile unionism have been 
erected and because it is in North Carolina that  the Piedmont 
textile region despl^ys at once some  of the most advanced 
and some of the most primitive examples of the cotton textile 
manufacturing processes    and of the  relations between manage- 
ment and labor. 
The year 1880 is customarily and arbitrarily accepted 
as the birth date of the Cotton Mill Campaign, that almost 
evangelical effort on the part of Bourbon and merchant alike, 
not to re-make  the desolated  South in the image of the indus- 
trial North,   but  to bring to Dixie the blessings of a diversi- 
fied economy based partially on the manufacture of the staple 
•Jf- 
agricultural product of the South and thus to rescue that 
u.happy region from its double handicap of soil erosion 
and the one-crop system. So fervent was the desire of 
these prophets of  Southern  industrialism  that the  often-re- 
peated story of the Salisbury,  North Carolina,minister 
who donated religious justifications and money-raising 
acumen to arouse in the inhabitants of that town a determin- 
ation to establish a cotton mill was,  though unusual, not 
out of keeping with the prevailing excitement of the tines. 
In amazement at the zeal with which the proponents of the 
"New South" went  about their mission it is easy to overlook 
the fact that  there had  been cotton mills in the South be- 
fore the Civil War and that the presence of those ante- 
bellum industries, though radically altered by the events of 
the Cotton Hill Campaign,  provided a starting point for 
the new effort.  Less tangible influences of those  early 
mills were their impact on their workers and the passing 
on of an acceptance of the custom of mill work to this 
new generation, thus predisposing psychological acqui- 
escence of this new element in the Southern way of life. 
Notwithstanding the eagerness with which the course 
of industrialism was pursued by the Southern captains of 
»souti MUM!* BWttHMHtt. 
!92iTppT 16. 
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industry, there were almost insurmountable obstacles to 
overcome. The ticklish business of gathering capital from 
a bankrupt South and an unfriendly North; the shadowy line 
between cooperation with creditor commission men and econom- 
ic bondage to them in marketing the product of the mills; 
the arduous task of training an uneducated country peasan- 
try to operate fairly complicated machinery—these were, 
in the beginning,  the difficulties with which the South 
2 
was confronted.     It  is  scarcely to be wondered at that 
the corn-unity  (for it was,  in fact,  the community as a 
whole that built the cotton mills)  failed to be troubled 
by such concerns  of social welfare as child labor, wages 
and hours legislation,   sanitation,  and employee education 
and recreation when engaged in a struggle for economic 
survival.   Furthermore,  it can be understood that these 
issues,  once raised,  could easily be pushed aside for later 
attention or forgotten altogether. 
Though there is no single determinable cause for the 
sudden shift to cotton manufacturing in 1880,  Broadus Mit- 
chell has postulated  several immediate  reasons why the 
Cotton Mill Campaign began when it did: the desire to con- 
tinue manufacturing made necessary by the Civil War, the 
natural process of recovery following that war, the resto- 
ration of confidence in Southern political institutions.so 
that non-Southern investors had no fear for the safety of 
their investments in Southern manufacturing ventures, the 
2Broadus Mitchell and George Sinclair Mitchell.  The 
Industrial Revolution in The South (Baltimore, Maryland. 
The Johns Hopkins Press,   1930)»   P»   10* 
presence in the South of a quietly competent    body of 
business and professional men who advocated liberal com- 
mercial and manufacturing policies, and the rising price 
of cotton believed destined to continue in large returns. 
Add to these  the  return to  specie payments and  the rapid 
expansion of the network of  Southern railroads in the late 
1870's, and the stage was  set for the Cotton Mill Campaign. 
The International Cotton Exposition held in Atlanta in l88l 
capped both the carefully planned and the natural preparations 
for the growth of the Southern textile industry by drawing 
together the spokesmen of the New South and by serving 
notice to the North that the South was open to  investment 
and, as it happened.,  to exploitation.? As if in answer to 
the energy generated by the  prophets and   by the Atlanta 
Exposition,  the number  of mills advanced kQ.K per cent 
from 1880 to 1890 and 67A per cent from I89O to 1900, 
the size of the mills easily growing to parallel the increase 
6 
in numbers. 
The personnel to chart the course of the cotton tex- 
tile mills was recruited from the Bourbons and then from the 
merchant elements of Southern society. It was at first the 
"big man" in the community—the lawyer, doctor, former 
plantation owner—who directed the industrial establish- 
ment, but he soon gave way to the merchant-turned-manufactur- 
er, to the acquisitive sons of the storekeeper. It was this 
3Broadus Mitchell, Op.. C^t., pp. 98 ft. 
Ibid, . p. 7^.   . „ 
Ibid., p. 122 
6U2i&., P. 68. 
newer generation of managers which began the process of 
withdrawing the mill and its everyday activities from 
the mainstream of community concern so that the mill 
and its workers were progressively alienated from the 
ongoing life  of the community.   From the establishment of 
the cotton mills for the purpose  of rehabilitating the 
South economically and  socially to the present raison 
i<etre of the cotton industrial comple* as a largely peou* 
niary venture needed but the passage of two or,   at most, 
three or four  generations.   In time and,  as it seemed, 
inexorably, the community-conscious founding generation 
gave way tc the establishment of a managerial elite far 
removed  from the level of the  mill worker and, until 
quite recently,   largely divorced  from the community sur- 
rounding  the mill. 
At the opposite end of frhe hierarchy stood the mill 
operatives, entering the gates of the mills from their 
gullied, worn-out farms7 and from the neighboring Blue 
Hidge Mountains8.  The opening  of the mill gates was an 
economic boon to these rural disinherited, and willingly 
and even thankfully they left the unproductive soil. Coming 
as he did from a life haunted by past, present, and future 
Poverty, and with the realization that he was to perform an 
an essential if supporting role in the Southern industrial 
7 Glean Oilman, Human Relates. ^&%^&* 
Southeast  (Chapel Hill:  ThTTTniversity of North Carolina 
Press, 19%),  p.  36. 
benjamin franklin Lemert, The £<^3&tfUft SgliftfcZ 
of the Southern Appalachian Piedmont   (Chape; Hill; The Unl- 
verslty  of North'Carolina Press,   1933)»   P«  <*• 
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drama,  the worker was  able  to leave with scant regret 
the land  he and  his  fathers had  tilled for generations. 
In the mill he developed a degree of self-assurance and 
security,  conscious of the vitality of his new function 
and of the significance of his status. Yet, he was  (in 
spite of being known as  "Jack-  or "Tom" by the owner-mana- 
ger and of being questioned with friendly, not-yet-condescend- 
ing concen^bout his family affairs) aware that he had in 
some way demeaned himself by leaving  the farm  for the mill, 
feeling that others  outside the mill gates realized  the 
Q 
descent in his  status.    Thus,   this  socn-to-be-forgotten 
nan turned more and more away from the  life outside the 
mill gates or beyond the environs of the mill village and 
became,  in  spite  of his ingrained agrarian individualism, 
clannish. 
The  textile worker,however essential his role as a 
machine adjunct and  however ardently he was  courted  by the 
original mill operators,   saw or perhaps merely felt himself 
divorced from the life  outside  the mill and his existence 
as a "lint head" and became used to feeling that he    was 
an inferior person.   Southern shop girls and merchants   who 
tolerated him only long enough to take his money—the goods 
and services  for which it was  exchanged were given increas- 
ingly grudgingly—confirmed and reinforced his suspicions, 
-ore vital in the alienation of the worker from the main- 
stream of Southern society was the lack of interest in his 
10 
9Gilman, Op.. Cit.. pp. I63f. 
10Gilman, Op.. Cit.T p. 9k. 
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situation evidenced by the leaders of the community. As the 
progressive hostility of the shopgirl proceeded apace with 
the progressive lack of interest of the civic leaders,  the 
worker's existence as a recognizable part of  Southern 
community life was implicitly denied. 
Just as Southern society chose to forget the cotton 
mill worker as an entity worthy of note,  so did the great 
body of cotton mill workers  quickly quell any outward mani- 
festations of worker unrest. Coming as they did from farms 
and mountain  reaches devastated by the paucity of natural 
resources, they placed themselves,  out of utter necessity, 
in the hands  of the cotton mill operators. Those operators, 
out of comparable necessity,  accepted the obligation for 
caring  for the workers  in the most obvious, unsophisti- 
cated,  and necessary acts  of paternalism ever evidenced on 
the American  scene.  That the workers repaid this paternalism 
with thankfulness and  devotion is  shown by their immediate 
and utter rejection (in the early period of industrial 
relations)  of any stirrings of dissatisfaction and incipient 
revolt.11 
What were the personality characteristics of this 
cotton mill worker that he would allow himself to be so 
forgotten and neglected by the community around him?    Three 
ethnic strains were mingled in him—Anglo-Saxon, Celtic, and 
Teutonic—all North European in origin.1    His religious in- 
1:LBroadus Mitchell,   "A New Voice in the South? 
Soanonweal, Vol. XI (April 30, 1930), p. 73*. 
l2Gilman,   Og.   Cit.,  p#  35 
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heritance   (whether Presbyterian,  Baptist, Methodist, 
Lutheran, Moravian,   or Quaker), deeply  ingrained with a 
stringent interpretation of the Christian or Protestant 
ethic,  emphasized frugality,  thrift,  industry,   and  individ- 
ual responsibility for his actions.  ^ That this native 
Southern agrarian—for the original worker in the cotton 
mills had  bred  into him the  intense independence of the 
old-line farmer—could and would allow himself to become 
utterly dependent upon the good will of the mill operator 
is an indication of the  financial distress he  left  behind 
et 
when he began his  journey to the mill.   Interestingly enough, 
this forgotten man  of the  South could  speak and react from 
the depth of his  involvement in the paternalistic  scheme 
to the "foreign"  elements of textile unionism in the 1930"s. 
Indeed, it may be concluded that the worker's long dormant 
sense of independence may have been one of the factors which 
has long dogged with defeat any movement for collective 
action. 
While the religious heritage of the Southern tex- 
tile worker may have contributed to his prejudice against 
collective  action,   it almost certainly  gave to him a reason 
for accepting his sorry financial and social lot.  The 
fact that early textile mills were extremely erratic and 
unstable,   stopping and  returning to production almost without 
-. .. 
1:5Gilman,  Op..  Cit.,   p.   36. 
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varning,  contributed to the worker's insecurity;  there- 
fore a religion which promised a glorious after-life if 
all the earthly ethical rules were followed allowed the wor- 
ker to experience conditions which would  otherwise have 
continually frustrated him.1* Significantly,  the worker's 
expectation of pie in the sky contributed to his accept- 
ance of his meager earthly reward and accustomed him to 
the psychological demands  of the paternalistic  system. 
John Borland noted in his exhaustive study of a mill 
village that  'Mill people  seem to feel that there  is 
little they can do to change the  situations that face 
them. Yet this need not cause undue concern;  "for every- 
thing is in the hands of the Lord."'1? 
Just as the worker was caught between the ex- 
pectation of absolute submersion in the early cruelties 
of the industrial process and the specter of having to 
return to the almost completely hcneless life he had l#ft, 
so was his child mortgaged to the life of the mill. Much 
has been written about the plight of the child in the 
Southern textile mills,   but though mill  surroundings were 
undoubtedly unhealthy,   the  child was quite accustomed to 
hard labor  on the  family farm  so recently vacated or on 
the sharecropper's plot left behind. Thus, his entry into 
the mill was "understood" and  the sin of  the mill owner in 
:«   »ir 
%orland, fi£. QA£.» P* 236' 
l5Morland, fift. Qii., P- *$*' 
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using child labor was as much one of omission as of 
commission,  for he was more often than not importuned by 
16 
heads of families to allow children to work in the mills. 
The real tragedy of child labor was contained  in the  slim 
prospect of future improvement held out as much as in the 
unhealthy conditions of mill work. Though the story of the 
floor sweeper who rose through hard work and  perseverance 
to an eventual office Job was told and  re-told,  the pos- 
sibility of its  re-enactment became increasingly remote 
as time wore on. When the problem of child labor finally 
attracted the attention of civil and religious authori- 
ties roughly a quarter century after the beginning of the 
Cotton Mill Campaign,  the employer's answer was both in- 
teresting and revealing.   In his formal assertion of his role 
in the paternalistic  system the employer translated at 
least to his  own  satisfaction what had at first been both 
an economic necessity and an "easy way out" into an in- 
tegral part  of the paternal relation between himself and 
his workers and,  inevitably,  into a positive good for 
both community and individual. 
The problem of child labor in the Southern cotton 
textile industry was actually solved not by legislative 
action but by the fact that the mills outgrew child labor. 
3y the 1920's the rate of growth had so slowed that it was 
unnecessary to engage an inefficient working force simply 
l6Gilman,   Oft.  &!&•#  P«  1*9. 
17Broadus Mitchell and George Sinclair Mitchell, 
2fi- Sii., p. n. 
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to man the machinery. Though wage levels had been lowered 
rather than raised at the end of World War I, their level 
was sufficient  to  eliminate the necessity  of child em- 
ployment to keep the laboring family together.  Finally, 
more complex machinery demanded such a degree of  skill 
that the untrained and  easily exhausted child was vir- 
tually eliminated from most of the Southern cotton 
1Q mills. 
The end of the First World war may be taken as 
a significant date in the history of the Southern cot- 
ton textile industry, for by this time the first gene- 
ration of mill personnel had passed out of the industrial 
picture. The founder-operator had been replaced by the 
nanager, and the old friendly concerned paternalism had 
become institutionalized into little more than a "system" 
for relatively peaceful industrial relations.  The first 
mill operators by rescuing the South from its poverty- 
stricken agricultural system had earned the allegiance 
of the workers and had consolidated their primary position 
19 
by means  of complete paternalism.       It was at best a dif- 
ficult task that their successors faced in following 
such unquestioned leaders, and in tragically numerous 
instances those successors either lacked or laid aside 
any knowledge of  Southern folkways in institutionalizing 
the cotton textile industry. 
l8Gilman,   0£.  Cit.,  pp.  162 f. 
^Broadus Mitchell,  "A New Voice in the South", p. 7&. 
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Wilbur J. Cash has definitively characterized this 
process of change in the managerial process: 
Most of the old barons were dead or dying, and when 
they weren't, were usually so engrossed in golf  at 
the country club or in the mania for speculating in 
land values or stocks that they .had no time left for 
the practice of their tncient amicable habits. In 
the main, their shoes were filled now by their sons 
or successors. Many of these had been trained in the 
tradition of the old close personal relationship 
between master and man and, particularly in the 
smaller mills, sought to continue it, but they 
were commonly quite as much absorbed in the country 
club and speculation as their elders, and so in their 
turn had little time really to cultivate it. Too, the 
generally greater spread in their education and back- 
ground made it more difficult for them to get close 
to the worker than it had been for their fathers. 
Still another thing that sometimes cut straight 
across the tradition was the Yankee cult of the Great 
Executive. Seducing the vanity especially of the young 
men who had been educated in the Northern business 
schools, and their imitators, it led them to surround 
themselves with flunkies and mahogany and frosted 
glass, with the result that the worker who had been 
accustomed to walking into the Old Man's office with- 
out ceremony could no longer get to them save at the 
cost of an effort and a servility which were foreign 
to his temper and tradition. 
These men of the new generation would by ordinary 
go or. contributing to and supporting the mill churches 
and schools, might in many instances make a great 
show of knowing their workers by their names and 
occasionally forgathering with them over the soda-pop 
box in the company store; but they did it, in part 
perhaps because of growing calculation, but more for 
the same reason that they wore a dinner jacket in the 
evening: because it was something one was supposea to 
do in the circumstances—habitually and mechanically, 
but, typically speaking, without the direct interest 
and zeal which had belonged to the older men. 
That is to say, the feeling which had laxn at 
the heart of the old notion of paternalistic duty 
was fast dwindling, leaving only tne shell-at the 
same time that the notion of paternalistic JElXi- 
lege was remaining as stronglyentranced as ever, 
a-t-evc. Perhaps being expanded The new barons^ 
to a man, held tightly to tne COIIVJ.<-^     , t  . 
right to'tell the worker what to Jo--as, for Instance, 
how to vote in an election—though now they often 
-15- 
tolti him through understrappers rather than direct- 
ly.  And  some of the more hard-bitten among them were 
beginning to resort to overt use of that power to 
coerce which had  been the  baron's all along,  and 
to emphasize their advice by firing whoever was 
discovered to have flouted it.20 
Just as the textile  operators had divorced  them- 
selves from the  traditional industrial  relationship in all 
but tfce most  superficial  remains,   so had  the cotton mill 
workers become a new breed.  When the first  operatives had 
entered the mill gates,  they had had an alternative to 
- 
mill work—returning,  if this hew way of life proved too 
uncongenial,   to their  farms.  No longer was  this exit opeo. 
The second and third generations  of textile laborers had 
forgotten the practices of the farmer; they had grown up 
iii the mill village and had turned to the loom and spindle 
for subsistence living. Besides,  the old farm had likely 
passed out of family ownership either through voluntary 
sale or through sacrifice to pay land taxes or mortgages. 
Not only were the mill workers alienated from the 
family farming heritage,   they belonged to the  generation 
which could expect no further territorial acquisitions to 
draw them away to the lands of challenge.  Gold rushes, 
land rushes,  the acquisitive aspects of Manifest Destiny 
had long gone. There was no land in the West to attract 
the mill worker.  He was forced to remain in his mill 
village or to move to another much like the first. 
20 Wilbur J. Cash, The Mind of the South "Vintage" 
paperback edition   (New York:  Random House,   I960):  pp.   275f. 
(originally published by A.A.  Knopf, New York,  lW. 
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3ut what of this worker who remained on mill hill? 
The Southern textile laborers were as a group from 97 to 
99 per cent white native-born; the Slave,  Italians, Poles, 
Irish, Germans were conspicious by their absence as was the 
Negro.21 This new generation could read and was aware of the 
gulf separating mill hill from the  smug,   speculative,   in- 
tensely white-collar professionalism in the towns as it was 
aware of the hollowness of the worn-out and used-up pro- 
op 
testations of the new paternalism.**    The old primitive re- 
ligion of the fathers appeared to be the sole untainted 
remainder of the older days of cooperative venture;  it was 
this religion with its ingrained acceptance of things as 
they were and its implicit admonition to remain passive 
that served to temper the new stirrings in the Southern 
textile Piedmont. Yet there were other legacies from the 
Cotton Mill Campaign era—the growing clannishness of the 
workers as they were eliminated both explicitly and im- 
plicitly from the mainstream  of the  Southern way of life. 
Another inheritance,  the stories of success through persever- 
ance and hard work,  of the  rise from floor sweeping to 
sitting on the board of directors, was no longer capable 
2101iver Carlson.  "The Southern Worker Organizes," 
The Nation,  Vol. CXXXIX  (September 26,   193^),   P»  35^. 
22Wilbur J.  Cash,   "The War in  the  South,"  American 
"prcury, Vol. XIX (February, 1930), p.  167. 
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of inspiring belief and ensuring placidity.  This new 
reneration had heard the stories and had yet seen its 
fathers work long years and still not climb to anything 
like a psychologically satisfying status. 
From these enumerated legacies of the old order of 
things and from the conditions imposed by the passage of 
time the cotton mill workers became the first native 
American proletariat.  This is not to say that this de- 
scription properly evaluated the underlying tensions of 
the Southern industrial scene on the eve of the Great 
Depression: 
"They're satisfied," the personnel manager had said, 
looking at me from his clean office,  his rested body, 
his white collar,  his trim tweeds.  "Now and then one 
of them gets the swell-head and goes off to Detroit 
for big mcney. After a month he's broke and crawls 
back begging for his job.  But most of our people are 
local people and they're satisfied." 
What will happen when they stop being satisfied? 
Some day when they open their eyes and  suddenly see 
the heaps of rottan lumber they live in;  the grubby 
food they eat; their idiots and malborn;  their na- 
tive stock that cannot read a newspaper or  sign its 
•wn name;   their miasma  of religious  buncombe and  ra- 
cial prejudices black enough to black out the sun; 
their'bullring of meaningless days;  sunrise to sun- 
set the same drudgery,  the same iron-fisted choking 
off of every vital impulse—for $10 to $13 a week? 
Already they  begin to chafe.  They ask questions 
on the sly.  The strongest flare up In bitterness. 
"They don't pay you nothin1 down here." Yes, keep 
the floaters and drifters out.  New South!  You're 
right: they stir up trouble. They bring comparison 
with them.   A dangerous  thing,  comparison.   But  some 
day, for all your nice precautions,  the New Indus- 
trial South is  going tc  blow up.  You can't put all 
that pressure on powder without its blowing up.  How- 
ever ignorant, however supine these hill-billies 
may seem.to be,  at bottom they are a  strong people. 
They have sucked in savageness from their mountains, 
a burning thirst for freedom.  If ever they revolt, 
theirs will be the bloodiest revolt in history,  J 
ir i    ,r,„
23Paul Peters,  "Cotton Mill," American Mercury 
Vol. XVII  (Kay,   1929),   p.   9- 
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Rather, this description depicted what Northern industrial 
workers and labor organizers thought and hoped would hap- 
pen when the fuse to the Southern powder keg was lit.  The 
lighting of that fuse and the extinguishing of the ensu- 
ing conflagration is a later story. 
./hat remains to be noted about the textile worker 
is his physical condition,  for it proved to be this single 
element, more than any other that spurred the revolt in 
the Southern Piedmont.  The  elements  of his  physical con- 
dition—housing, hours, wages,  conditions of work—were 
the basic causes of both his leaderless and of his "foreign- 
led" strikes. 
The early housing was provided  by the mill  owners. 
3uilt in "villages'*  or  on "hills",   they were usually  small, 
dirty frame houses  situated along 15he sides of unpaved 
streets where the dust and mud served to blacken the 
already bleak structures.       Paul Blanshard visited  one of 
these dwellings: 
Gladys Caldwell invited us in.  We sat by a  tiny 
fireplace in her front room, which was also her bed- 
room.   On the walls  were a picture of Jesus and a calen- 
dar.   In the room were a bed,  a trunk,   and a dresser; 
in the room opposite were a trunk and a bed;  in the 
back corner room was a bed;  in the kitchen were a 
table, a bench, and an oil stove.   In the four rooms 
there were four chairs.   'Lhe house  had  no plaster,  no 
rugs,  no heating stove.   ' 
2l+ 
William Hays  Simpson,   Southern Textile Com- 
gnmities   (Durham,  North Carolina:  American Cotton Manu- 
facturers Association (?)  ), p.  26. 
2? 
Paul Blanshard,  "flow to Live on Forty-six Cents 
a Day," The Nat^n Vol. CXXVIII  (April 30,  1929), p.   580. 
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The condition of this house and its furnishings was all 
too common in the years immediately preceding the Great 
Depression. 
As to the natter of wages and hours, the old low 
wages and long hours were far too commonly compounded in 
the decade of the  'twenties by the application of the stretch- 
out system, a plan of increasing the work load of each ope- 
rative designed to increase production without comparable 
increases in the costs of production. This condition was 
pathetically nrevalent: 
"My husband and I go to the mill at seven. He's 
a stripper in the cardin'   room and gets $12,85 a 
week,  but  that's partly because they don't  let him 
work Saturday mornin'.  They put this  stretch-out 
system on him shore enough* You know he's runnin1 
four jobs ever since they put this stretch-out 
system on hi» and  he ainH gettin'  any more than 
he used to get for one.  Where'4 they put the other 
three men? Why they laid  'em off and.they give 
hin the same $12.85 he got before."-0 
Complicating and further delineating the plight of the 
Southern textile worker were the facts of child labor, 
the 55 or 60-hour work week, night work for women, and 
the North-South wage differential which in 1927 made the 
textile wages in the five leading New England textile 
states k7.8 per cent higher than the prevailing rate 
in the five leading Southern textile producing states.   ' 
Add to this the blatant commercialism of the Second 
Cotton Kill Campaign in the 1920's and the smoldering 
26"" Blanshard,   Loc.   Cit. 
27 Broadus Mitchell.and George Sinclair Mitchell, 
Stt-Eii., PP. 12f. 
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materials of worker unrest needed only a suggestion of 
solidarity to produce revolt. The Second Cotton Mill 
Cnapaign differed markedly from the original model of 
the l880's in its suppositions about the textile labor 
force: whereas a certain community of interest between 
operator and operative could be said to exist in the 
earlier period, the worker was now treated as a com- 
modity to be traded upon in a deal—he took on "statis- 
tical significance" as a unit of labor only.28 In other 
aspects of its energetic advertising campaign, the Second 
Cotton Mill Campaign took on inklings of Babbittry which 
exhibited its ultimately pecuniary aims: hich-pressure 
salesmanship and offers of tax reductions or exemptions 
to northern capital.2^ The workers saw these inducements 
offered to outsiders and then saw themselves saddled 
wit.i the stigma of mill Mils, their loss of status in 
the community outside, their pitifully inadequate wages 
and exhaustingly demanding working hours, the stretch- 
out system, their exclusion from the 'original operator- 
operative partnership. And they were willing to be docile 
no longer. 
The labor union had been the answer for labor 
discontent in other sections of the American industrial 
complex, but it had failed to make much headway in the 
_ _ 
28Gilman, Op.. Cit., p. 192. 
29Harriet Laura Herring, Southern Industry and 
Rerional Development (Chapel Hill: The University of 
north Carolina Press, 19^0), p. 3» 
<JK 
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South. In the decade of the  'twenties, workers could re- 
member infrequent and erratic Southern textile organizing 
campaigns which had swept great numbers of workers into 
the union—workers who slipped out of the fold as soon as 
the campaign ended but who significantly retained memories 
and a lingering tradition of unionism in many villages.3 
In the pre-Depression South, however,  the forces 
conspiring against the success of textile unionizing cam- 
caigns—the operators, the community,  the economic con- 
dition of the region, and the worker himself—were  suf- 
ficiently powerful to seriously hamper even the strongest 
labor unions.  The various national textile unions were far 
from strong. The most important, the United Textile Workers, 
an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor,  claimed, 
in 1929,   30,000 members,   less than 3 per cent  of the 
one million workers in all branches of textiles, and in 
the cotton textile field only 10,000 of half a million 
millhands were organized,   all  of these  in the  North.  The 
United Textile Workers,  as though not weak enough, was 
prey to the depredations of other craft unions to the right 
of its economic and social philosophies and to the revo- 
lutionary unions on the left,  chiefly the Industrial 
Workers of the World  (its main strength comin.r- from memories 
of its activities in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and Paterson, 
New Jersey) and the Communist-led and oriented National 
30Broadus Mitchell and George Sinclair Mitchell, 
S£. Oit., p. 19. 
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Textile Workers Union.  It was this last union which sparked 
the revolt  among the Piedmont millhands.31 
In mid-April,  1929, there were between seventeen 
and eighteen thousand millhands out on  strike in North 
Carolina and Tennessee. The three largest revolts were at 
Marion and Gastonia in North Carolina and Elizabethton, 
Tennessee. The Communist-oriented National Textile Workers 
Unicn fomented the Gastonia strike;  the United Textile 
iforkers led those in Marion and*  Elizabethton.  In addition 
there were widespread "leaderless" strikes all across 
the South Carolina textile Piedmont which were notable for 
the positive sentiment they engendered  "offn the mill 
op 
hills precisely because of their spontaneous natures.-' 
The strike at Gastonia  in the spring and summer 
of 1929 is remembered by loyal Russian Communists along- 
side the Potemkin riots.33 what began as a protest against 
wage cuts,  the introduction of the stretch-out system, ex- 
tensive piece work and the replacement of high wage with 
low wage laborers ended relatively soon in the duration 
of the disturbance when mob violence and civil repression 
ended the strike as a strike.  Following the end of the 
31Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years? A History of 
the American Worker. 1920-19^ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, i960),  pp.   llf. 
32Broadus Mitchell and George Sinclair Mitche^, 
£&• &!&•» P.  16. 
■^^conversation with Mr.  Jordan Kurland, who 
was a visiting professor at the University of Moscow 
during the academic year 1959-1960. Mr. Kurland was con- 
gratulated upon the Gastonia affair while in Moscow. 
I- 
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actual strike (After the company manager of the Loray 
Mill peremptorily rejected the economic demands of the 
strikers, political issues gained paramount importance 
and the strike per se was over.),  the chronicle of vio- 
lence on both sides of the political and economic fence 
race the Piedmont North Carolina town a battleground of 
conflicting ideologies. Eventually the Communist-led 
National Textile Workers Union was discredited and  the 
Gastonia representatives of that union were convicted in 
a sensational trial for the alleged murder of the Gas- 
tonia chief of police.  It boded ill for the future of 
congenial government-labor relations that one of the 
prosecution attorneys was Clyde R. Hoey,  later Governor 
and United States Senator from North Carolina.J 
Neither the American Federation of Labor nor 
the United Textile Workers had displayed any sympathy 
for the Gastonia revolt,   but that  revolt and  its  political 
aftermath reviewed a lesson:   that  though the  sympathy of 
the community might be aroused for the mill workers  (as 
in the "leaderless"  strikes in South Carolina),  any hint 
of political and of social radicalism or any union demands 
for racial equality^ wduld immediately ignite drastic 
community repudiation of the worker's aims*even rvcual com- 
,!■(:. 
^Bernstein, Op.. Clt.. pp. 20fff. 
3^The National Textile Workers had demanded racial 
equality in the Loray mill,  which had employed only two 
Negro workers out of 3200 employees—and these two Negcres 
had fled the mill at the first notice of impending strike. 
(Bernstein,   Op,.  Cijt.,  p.   33.) 
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munity action on the side of repression to underline that 
repudiation.  Such lessons as  that of Gastonia could  serve 
only to reinforce the conviction of the American Federation 
cf Labor that it should pursue exclusively the economic 
aims of higher wages,  shortened working hours, and improved 
conditions of work.  Further,  the Gastonia experience heart- 
ened those conservative factions of the organized labor 
movement who now spoke openly of the community of interest 
betwee.. conservative labor and the businessman and who 
sought to legitematize the American Federation of Labor 
and its affiliates as compared with the more radical 
fringes of the   labor movement. 
The strikes at the Baldwin and Clinchfield Kills 
in Marion actually were  ignited in April,   1929,   by the 
fires of the "leaderless" revolts, and the course of 
the strike and  the court action which followed it lasted 
until nearly Christmastime.  The strikes—or the strike, 
since both Baldwin and Clinchfield were under the same 
management — were characterized by noticeable solidarity 
of the striking force,  solidarity made all the more dif- 
ficult to maintain because of the use of civil authorities 
and legal machinations on the side of the employer. Arbi- 
trary dismissal of union members,  the coercion of strikers 
by local clergy and church boards,  calling in of credit by 
local merchants, and attempted mediation by a disinterested 
textile manufacturer and banker were features of the strike. 
The United Textile Workers and the America.-:  Federation of 
-25- 
Labor aided little in financing ana organizing the strike, 
and it was over the protest of the UTW representative in 
the area that the strike call was sounded in the first plaCA.36 
Against such heavy odds it is not surprising that the strike 
failed miserably to ameliorate those conditions against 
which the workers revolted. What was significant for the 
course of textile unionism was the indication that the 
lines of conflict had been clearly drawn: the workers were 
almost entirely on their own—they could expect little sym- 
pathy from townspeople and none from mill managers. Even 
their churches deserted them. And the labor union aided 
little in their struggle for a more equitable return for 
their work. On the other hand, the solidarity of the mill- 
hands against their mountainous opposition was indeed mag- 
nificent, for the lint heads did not retreat from the picket 
lines until fired upon and did not give up the strike until 
it was absolutely liquidated. 
The reasons for the defeat of the Piedmont millhands 
were evident everywhere—in the inability, or unwillingness 
of the mill operator to reach any compromise with the union; 
in the psyche of the worker: his traditional acquiescence 
in paternalism, his suspicion of Northerners and radicals, 
his ingrained individualism which hampered collective action; 
in the inattentive and then incensed community; in the 
36 
Bernstein, Op.. Git., pp. 29fff. 
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blatant radicalism of the National Textile Workers Union 
and the fcalfheartedness of the United Textile Workers.  Yet 
the revolt  of the  Piedmont millhands did  arouse the Amer- 
ican Federation of Labor to endorse at least a token union 
organizing campaign in 1929.3    Thougfc the 1930 organizing 
drive of the United Textile  Workers   (through which the 
API-endorsed drive was carried out) was patently a failure 
in winning recognition for the union,  the experience of 
organizing would not die out and be lost on later generations 
of textile workers. 
More positively,  Gaston County  (home   of Gastonia) 
textile mills decreased hours of wbrk with no comparable 
reduction in wages;  at Marion hours were  shortened,  wages 
increased,  and welfare benefits liberalized.  And in 1930 
the Cotton Textile Institute voted to abolish night work 
for women and minors under the age of eighteen.-^    In- 
tangible benefits accrued,  too:  sensitive Southerners 
had been distressed by the specter of bloody revolt and 
reprersion and this shock aroused religious organizations, 
educational bodies, and civic groups at least to question 
the heretofore untouchable and unalterable power of the 
mill owner and every manifestation of the paternalistic 
system. 
^Bernstein,   Op,.  Cit.,   p.   3*+« 
38 Ibid.,  p.  h2. 
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By the end of the   'twenties the plight of the 
industrial South and of the millhand in particular was 
indeed desperate: 
The  Piedmont  on the eve  of the  Great Depression 
was a microcosm of all America in the  somber decade 
to follow.  On this beautiful and tragic land..-.the 
millhands1  revolt put in relief the great labor issues 
that wore to absorb the entire nation in the thirties. 
Here were the problems of economic collapse—of po- 
verty,   of unemployment,   of relief.   Here,   too, were  the 
questions  of labor standards—of low wages,  of long hours, 
of night work for women and children., of factory sani- 
tation and company housing,  of workmen's compen- 
sation.  Here,  as well, were the  fundamental issues of 
collective bargaining—of the right to organize and 
bargain, of discrimination for union membership or 
activity,   of the company union,  of the labor injunction, 
of the  right to strike and  conduct  strikes,   of the 
appropriate role of the government In labor disputes. 
Here also were the chronic problems of the American 
labor movement—of  its weakness,   internal division 
and drift,   of the deep-seated  reluctance  of craft 
unions to sponsor industrial organization, of rival 
unionism,   of Communism.  Here was the painful problem 
of the rigidity of  the American employer....Here was 
violence,  the extraordinary American tradition of 
solving disputes with guns instead of words.3. 
Periodically the American federation of Labor 
attempted to plant textile unions in the South during 
the decade of the  'thirties. The first such attempt in 
193^-1935 produced a general strike, and employer-spon- 
sored opposition to unionism flared into fcpen terrorism, 
the use of the militia,  eviction from mill villages, and 
actual violence.      In 1939, another general organizing 
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Textile Workers left after the exodus of large segments 
of that union out of the American Federation of Labor 
and into the Committee for Industrial Organization,^1 
In his call for the Atlanta conference to organize such 
a Southern drive,   President  William Green of the AFL 
asserted that the chief objective would be the textile 
industry and  that this,   the  "widest  organizational campaign 
.X 
ever conducted in the South" would proceed in the organi- 
zational drive without regard for the activities of the 
Committee for  Industrial Organization since that body had 
done little of last importance in Dixie.      The AFL approach 
centered  or. affirmations  of a community  of interest between 
businessmen and labor, of the efficacy of state legislative 
action as opposed to federal governmental action,  and of 
the "business-oriented"  psychology of the worker as opposed 
to his class consciousness.   J 
The really significant movement for Southern tex- 
tile organizing campaigns came under the aegis of the 
Textile Workers  Organizing Committee of  the Committee for 
Industrial Organization which in 1935 garnered the affil- 
iation of the United Textile Workers and,  in 1939,  a majority 
of the UTW locals and became the Textile Workers Union of 
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with the American Federation of Labor and formed again 
the United Textile Workers of America  (UTW-AFL).1^ 
John L. Lewis,   chairman of the Committee  for Industrial 
Organization,  explained the  objectives of the 1937 
Southern drive of the YV/OC as being "collective bargain- 
ing, the right to organize,   the privilege  of being Amer- 
icans." ' In order to avoid being tagged with the epi- 
thets "nigger lover"   or "atheistic Communist",  the TWOC 
sought to use field  representatives  who spoke the  same 
language with the  same  regional inflections  of the mill 
workers.      However, most of the gains of the 1937-1938 
organizing campaign were made during the drives begun 
during the first six monthe of the campaign,  for the 
1937-1933 depression made any further attempts at organizing 
activity both impractical and unwise from financial and 
psychological standpoints.  ' 
Complicating  the CIO Southern textile drive of 
1937-1938 was the dissension in North Carolina which led 
to the ousting  of Roy R.   Lawrence,  the Carolinas admini- 
strator for the TWOC  from the presidency of the North 
Carolina  Federation of Labor. Allegedly, Mr.   Lawrence had 
^"Bernard Yabroff and Ann J.  Herlihy,  "History of 
^ork Stoppages in the Textile Industries," Monthly Labor 
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committed treason by holding office in both the CIO and 
the State Federation of Labor, an AFL affiliate.1*8 Such 
internecine warfare did little to advance the cause of 
organized labor.   In fact, the in-fighting did not' end in 
1937 but recurred in 1952 when the ranks of the TWUA in 
iiorth Carolina were thinned as several thousand workers 
re-affiliated with the UTW-AFL,  this time against  the 
actions of the  officialdom of the TWUA on the national 
level. ^ Both incidents did little to answer those at- 
tackers who criticized- the internal division of the labor 
movement in their efforts to discredit unionism.  In ad- 
dition, the divisive factors within the body of organized 
labor could not have been other than confusing and dis- 
heartening for those millhands who,  just  "discovering" 
unionism,  and  seeing in it the  leadership to move them from 
economic and social oblivion,   saw those who were to be 
their leaders engaged in trying to kill other labor ordan- 
izations. 
In spite of the damage done the Southern or- 
ganizing drive by the 1937-1938 depression,  this TWOC 
report at the 1939 TWUA convention was optimistic. The 
renort claimed  for TWOC  27 contracts covering 27,000 
workers be}.ow the Nason-Dixon line,  the winning of sixty 
-•ational Labor Relaions Board  elections covering 1+0,000 
h9 
New York Times, May 17, 1937, P- 13. 
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Southern workers, and the signatures of 85,000 Southern 
textile workers on pledge cards.  Even more optimistically 
the report continued: 
Cotton textile employers are  loosening their 
hold on politics,  church], thought, and life in the 
South.   In place  of the cotton "feudal  system"slowly 
the new liberal South is  building genuine democracy 
founded on a recognition of the rights of porkers. 
The union is proud to share in their work.5° 
There were those who questioned the ease of or- 
ganizing the South,  though,  Some noted the cost of or- 
ganizing activities and  the great number of Southern tex- 
tile installations. Another difficulty would be found in 
the purely financial aspect of union dues: would the tex- 
tile workers now under the new umbrella of federal wage 
and hours legislation,  earning more monty than ever be- 
fore, figure that he needed to pay union dues??1 The 
first question was answered piece-meal:  the Southern 
field was expensive to  organize and TWUA tactics had to 
be change4 from time to  time to deal with this problem. 
Other factors were of more importance than mere pecuniary 
import in the answer to the second question of the sceptics. 
During the years of World War II textile unionizing 
activities as such were not the issues for debate that the 
question of government-imposed minimum wages turned  out to 
be. In 19lfl the  United States  Supreme Court upheld  the 
50 
51 
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validity of the minimum wage for cotton textile workers, 
both North and South in a case dealing in its latger im- 
plications with the concept of federal governmental  es- 
tablishment o4 minimum wages for industrial workers. 
During the war years,  the  iar Labor Board was active in 
increasing the wages of textile workers and  in holding 
out the hope of eliminating the North-South differen- 
tial, actions which produced sharp cries of favoritism 
to Northern textile interests and to organized labor from 
Major L.P.  1'cLendon,  an attorney for large  North Carolina 
textile manufacturing interests.?3 Even the New York 
Times got into the fracas with an editorial condemning 
"inflationary" wage increases.      Though the  War Labor 
loard did not eliminate the North-South differential^ 
it did, in 19*+5, grant a 55-cents an hour minimum wage to 
all textile workers,  both North and South. Immediately, 
the TWUA, which had lobbied for a 76-cents per hour min- 
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no-strike pledge entered into on December 21,  1°M, charging 
that the U'ar Labor Board was guilty of partiality and had 
been subjected to political    pressures which it had failed 
to withstand.-" Though union organizing activities had not 
made headlines during the war years, the TWUA reported that 
the Southern textile wage had increased  106 per cent  be- 
tween 19^1 and 19M-5, this increase due to the pressure of 
wartime labor shortages, to the actions of the War Labor 
'toard, and to tremendous wartime textile profits.^° 
As soon as V-J Day had come and gone,  the AFL and 
the CIO again turned to the  South,  again in opposition 
to each other and to the textile barons of the Piedmont. 
President William Green of the American Federation of Labor 
vas first to announce the Southern drive, making it clear 
that the AFL would  base its campaign in competition with 
the CIO on the issue of Communism versus Americanism and 
declaring that the  Southern millhands would be told that 
they had a choice between "a foreign controlled organization 
and an American organization. That is the issue that will 
be drawn in the South.  It will be drawn not so much by us 
but by those who would deceive and betray the workers in 
the South."59 Green continued to pledge "an aggressive, 
militant, uncompromising organization campaign.  It does 
not matter whether we are opposed by groups of employers 
57 
58 
New York Times. February 21, lfH-5. 
'ibid., April 23, 19^6, p. 23. 
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or by the rebel,  rival union. We are going to rife rough- 
shod over them and never stop till we succeed in organ- 
izing the unorganized in the South."60 Van A.  Bittner, 
the director of the CIO's Southern organizing    campaign, 
retorted,   "Let  Green roar and  the CIO will  organize."6l 
On June 15,  19^6,  the CIO launched Operation Dixie, 
throwing 252 field representatives of the CIO and numerous 
organizers of other national unions in the Congress into 
62 
the Southern drive.      The textile industry in the South was 
to be of major concern in Operation Dixie, and the TWUA 
sent its own organizers into the field and pledged $125,000 
to the general CIO drive in an attempt  to raise the number 
pf unionized workers  in the Southern textile industry above 
the 20 per cent level.   ^ 
The obstacles faced by Operation Dixie in the tex- 
tile industry were numerous and of long-standing strength. 
Subsequent drives of less inclusive character (solely 
within the textile industry)  sought also to break the back 
of Southern opposition  to unionization.   In ll53 the UTW 
6oNew York Times. April 30, 19^, p.  15. 
61 
62 
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threw squads of organizers into the nine areas and them 
two years later shifted tactics and sent seventy organizers 
into an unsuccessful attempt to crack the anti-union ban 
in the Pepperell,  Cannon, and Burlington chains.      In 1956, 
the united AFL-CIO authorized,  in spite of bitterness between 
the UTW and the TWUA,   stemming In part from the 1952 dis- 
pute already mentioned, a new textile drive to be under- 
taken by the Textile Workers Union of America against 
the Cannon,  Burlington, and Pepperell chains.65 By 1959 
the TWUA (AFL-CIO) now merged, had been relegated to the 
unfortunate position of making demands for wage increases 
for union workers after the large unorganized plants had 
announced wage increases.  On December 1,  1958,  65 union 
organizers stood outside the North Carolina plants of the 
J.P. Stevens Company,  Burlington Industries, and Cannon 
Kills, passed out union leaflets, and after this one acti- 
vity claimed credit for wage increases when they were 
, 66 anno need. 
The reasons for the partial failure of textile 
unionism in the South (only a partial failure because 
many of the largest plants were unionized,  notably Cone 
•ills, Erwln Cotton Kills, and the Marshall Field Com- 
pany6'') are manifold. Many of those failures are to be 
6lf"End of Textile Unionism?" Fort-one. Vol.   56 
(December,  1957),   p.   232. 
6*Nev York Times, July 11,  1956. 
66"Textile Stratagems",  Fortune. Vol.  59 (April, 1959), p. 202 
67Iohn W.  Kennedy,  On.. Cit.,  pp.  Il6f. 
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found. The reasons for them are varied. The emphasis 
i 
placed on racial equality positively by the unions and 
negatively by those who sought to destroy unionism were 
hurtful to labor organization. The resistance of some 
employers to any dimunition in their power minimized the 
chances for union organizing successes. In the failure of 
organized religion to deal creatively with an evolving 
social scheme, in civil and governmental repression, and in 
the hostility of some segments of the daily press toward 
union activities the seeds of union defeat were sown. 
• 
What Hamilton Basso wrote in 193*f about race 
relations in Southern industry had lost some of its truth 
through the passage of years, but his analysis still, in 
its major emphases, was an accurate accounting of some 
of the problems which the labor unions faced: 
It will be a long time before the average Southern 
white worker joins a movement he considers "nigger." 
It is only proper to realize, harsh though the realiza- 
tion may be, that the ordinary Southern worker be- 
longs to a class that distrusts and frequently hates 
the Negro. The fact that the Negro is an economic com- 
petitor has something to do with it, but it resolves 
itself, ultimately, into a question of identity. The 
white worker in the South does not represent, as he 
does in the North, the proletariat. There is yet one 
class beneath him—a class which permits him to think 
of himself as a superior person, politically and 
ethnologically, a member of an upper class pos- 
sessed of certain.privileges and attainments. The 
Negro gives him somebody to look down upon, oc- 
casionally to abuse, frequently to despise. It is 
not a point of view he ©an abandon in a moment--or 
one he would be willing t- abandon if he could.°° 
_,    68Hamilt0n Basso, "The Divided Southern Heart," 
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Politicians catered to the poor white's abhorrence 
of the Negro to win votes.   Senator Ellison D.  Smith  (Cot- 
ton Ed),  (Democrat-South Carolina)f in a radio address warned 
that if the CIO were successful in its activities, the time 
would come when Southern white workers would be placed 
alongside Negroes at  the cotton looms.°9 
Some employers charged   the CIO with being a  "nig- 
ger union" and  sponsored sermons and anti-union newspaper 
advertising campaigns; a few even went to the length of in- 
directly purchasing the CIO pamphlets "The CIO and the 
Negro Worker" and  "Working and   Fighting Together Regard- 
less of Race, Color,  Creed,  or National  Origin"  and dis- 
tributed them among white workers in the hope of making 
those workers impervious to union platforms and promises.70 
Southern Negroes were aware of these machinations, too, 
but they also realized the potentialities of non-discrim- 
inatory unions.  As a African Methodist Episcopal bishop 
nerhaps too optimistically  stated the  reaction: 
"'.men I first heard of the CIO,  I asked "What does it 
stand for?" The answer I got was,   "White and colored 
in the same union." When I heard that, I put on my 
war boots and my preachin'   coat,  and i^been preachin1 
the nrincinles of ClOism ever since!" 
Nevertheless,  racial discrimination had become in- 
stitutionalized,  for the legal necessity of providing 
I 
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separate accomodations for Negro and white workers in the 
textile mills would have  imposed extra  financial burdens 
on mill management, and the exclusion of Negroes from 
skilled jobs in the industry prior to the New Deal period 
permanently, it seemed, allowed  the white worker to pre- 
72 ercpt the most desirable positions in the mills.      However, 
both Negro and white workers were admitted  to  some TV/HA 
locals in equal terms except in such cases where each race 
provided enough workers to warrant establishing two se- 
parate union locals as was the  case in the Marshall Field 
mills.      Thus, even when the union did come into a plant, 
it could happen that the presence of the union served to 
strengthen the existing bonds of racial discrimination. 
Employer opposition to unionization in the South- 
ern textile industry seemed  in many instances to have been 
copied exactly from earlier union-busting techniques used 
In the North in the first decades of the twentieth cen- 
tury. In the Southland,  in addition,  the hostile employer 
could throw the race issue into the lap of his Workers; 
he did—with a four-page illustrated leaflet featuring a 
picture of the daughter of John L.  Lewis posing between 
two Negroes, the picture bearing the caption "Don1^ Let 
This Happen to You or Your Family" and  "Don't Let Your 
'Herbert  R.   Northrup,   Organized Labor and  the. 
Negro (Mew York:   Harper and Brothers,   19W,  p.   119. 
73 Northrup, On.. Git., p.  120. 
AjkJC' 
-39- 
./IFE or DAUGHTER or SISTER be  founrt in the position of 
the woman in the  picture above—Defeat the CI0.M7^ 
In the era of the 1930's Southern employers 
allowed the formation of "Friendship Associations" and 
"Good-Will Clubs", thinly disguised company unions. Over- 
seers or second hands passed around petitions for the 
formation of such bodies, and union authorities accused 
the textile plant managers of discharging or evicting from 
company houses those workers who insisted upon entering 
the "real" unions.  In  some cases,   the management of tex- 
tile mills did not bother to deny that it Biad instigated 
the formation of Friendship Associations but insisted 
boldly that such activities did not in their intent vio- 
• 
late the injunction against such employer interference 
75 contained in the   ./agner Act. 
•urlington and Cannon Mills workers were es- 
I 
pecially unrespc.sive  to union appeals.  Emil  Kieve, 
President of the TWUA answered whfen questioned about 
this lack of enthusiasm,   "We  just can't get the  people." 
One of the factors making  for  this  condition was  the  prac- 
tice of both firms of shifting production from a mill 
under union organizing attack to numerous other plants, 
in some cases even closing down the threatened plants.'6 
7*+ 
John C. Cort,   "Unions  in the  South," Commonweal. 
v°l. 52 (February 2,  195D, p. k2h. 
75 
.nit. Louis  Stark in the New York Times   .  November 2*+, 
1935, Section 2,   p.   2. ^^ 
76 tM,tT    Ofc*. John W. Kennedy, '0£.  Cit., p. 27. 
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In testimony before a subcommittee of the United 
States Senate Labor and  Public  Welfare Committee,  Rieve 
presented the following list of employers' methods of 
suppressing unionism in the South: .^ 
Surveillance of organizers and union adherents; 
propaganda through rumors,  letters,  news stories, ad- 
vertisements,  speeches to the employees; denial of 
free speech and assembly to the union;  organization 
of the whole community for anti-union activity;  la- 
bor esoionage; discharge of union aympathizers; 
violence and gunplay; injunctions; the closing  or 
moving  of the mill;   endless  litigation before the 
National Labor Relations Board and the courts,  etc. 
If all this fails,  the employer will try to 
stall,  in slow succession,  first the election,  then 
the certification of the union, and  finally the ne- 
gotiation of a contract. Few organizing campaigns 
survive  this  type  of onslaught.7/ 
In many instances the textile manufacturer used   the 
press to his  own advantage through having complimentary 
explanations  of their  "concern"  for their workers spread 
across Sunday feature sec'tions.7    Other "fringe" papers 
appeared earlier,   notably Militant Truth which was  sig- 
nificantly sent to mill workers "with the compliments of 
A Friend"  on the  eve  of many National Labor Relations 
Board elections with the address of the worker noted in 
precisely the same way as on mail addressed to him by the 
company.79 Another example of the  "fringe" anti-union 
newssheet was Progressive Labor which was sent out from 
77New York Times. March  5,   1951,   ff«   1 and  18. 
78 An example  of this was Chester  S.   Davis's  fea- 
ture article, "Kannapolis: A Kingdom of the Cannons," 
Winston-Salem Journal-Sentinel.  August 16,  1959,   Section C,  p.   1. 
79- 
Stetson Kennedy, 0]£. Cit.,  p.  232. 
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Knoxville,  Tennessee,   but was   suspended during World V/ar 
II after an employer was found guilty of unfair labor 
practices unaer the provisions of the Wagner Act for hav- 
80 ing Progressive Labor sent to his employees.      Even so 
established and highly regarded an organ as the Greens- 
boro Daily News which generally included a syndicated 
column by Victor Riesel,  the labor columnist,  refused 
to print one of his series which contained an attack on 
the brutalities of Southern textile operators; the 
Charlotte Observer did print that particular column with 
81 an editorial underscoring  its  message. 
Neither the federal nor the  Southern  state  govern- 
ments held  out any hope for the union.  The passage  in 
19^7 of the Taft-Hartley Amendment  to the  1935 Wagner 
Act intensified the resistance of Southern  industrialists 
to collective bargaining;  a pattern o£ coercion, illegal 
firings, local injunctions against picketing,  organization 
of anti-union citizens'   committees,  and  protracted delays 
in bargaining which devastated union membership rolls de- 
veloped.       Those employers who again and  again attributed 
the failure of textile workers to ljoin unions to their 
"native" dislike of collective action might have looked 
at these repressive measures and re-examined their logic. 
80 Stetson Kennedy,   Op,. Cit.,  pp.   26lf. 
8l"Textile Labor",  Journal of the Textile Workers 
Union of America,   December,  1956,  p.   18. 
Willard   Shelton,   "Why Operation Dixie  Failed," 
The Nation,  Vol.  170,  No.   17   (April 29,   1950),  p.   391. 
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And those same employers who declared faith In the com- 
munity of interest between  operator and  operative yet 
flocked into trade associations and  simultaneously for- 
bade their workers to organize might at least have thought 
p a new rationalization.   So flagrant were abuses of the 
power of Southern employers that a Senate  Labor subcommittee 
accused the Southern textile industry of a  "widespread 
conspiracy"  to destroy unions  and charged  those employers 
with having used the Taft-Hartley Act for "union-busting" 
activities.  ^ Finally,  in 19%,  Boyd Payton  (who was to come 
into public notice in the later Harriet-Henderson debacle) 
led a group of twenty-one picketers  on a march outside  the 
.■/ashington offices of the National Labor Relations Board, 
charging the Isoard with failure to protect workers who 
m. 
had been discharged for union activities in the South.°^ 
Secretary of Labor James  P. Mitchell pledged at that time 
an investigation of those conditions which caused Payton's 
complaint.   ' 
Local officialdom was  in many cases patently guilty 
of labor union suppression. In Statesville,  North Carolina, 
where the Textile Workers Union of America had opened an 
organizing drive,  the city council passed an ordinance re- 
quiring that persons who would solicit paid memberships in 
83New York Times.  April 27,   1952,   p.   52. 
8LfIbid.,   October 2»+,   1956. 
8^Ibid.,  October 25,  1956. 
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clubs, associations,  or unions must be registered, must ob- 
tain a license and be fingerprinted, must furnish proof of 
no prior convictions  for felcny, and must present two referen- 
ces from local  residents  in  order to obtain a  license.   Each 
day's refusal to comply with the  stipulated   procedures con- 
stituted a separate offense punishable by a fine of $50 and/or 
a thirty-day  jail sentence.   Two other localities,  Taylorsville 
and Alexander County, wrote similar measures into their 
statute books,  and  Lexington would have    followed  suit had 
it not been for the presence of a strong labor contingent 
at the city council meeting when the proposed action was 
discussed. 
An examination of some of the policies  of four 
major North Carolina textile firms   (Chatham,  Cone,   Bur- 
lington Industries, Cannon Mills) is illustrative to 
so-.e decree of varying patterns of union suppression or 
acceptance.  Chatham and Cannon Mills both practice a high 
decree of paternalism;  the paternalism in Burlington Indus- 
tries is not  so much the  issue as are its practices of 
moving mills under union attack and  of announcing wage in- 
creases    tc exactly correspond with the launching of union 
organizing drives? The Cone Mills Corporation,  originally 
a highly paternalistic enterprise,  has accepted unionization 
of its working force. 
The management of Chatham Mills has been in the 
86„ Textile Labor," June, I960,  p.  19- 
J& 
Chatham family for four generations. The workers,  chiefly 
from Surry, Yadkin, and v/ilkes Counties are of the same ra- 
cial stock, are native born, and are typical products of 
the "orth Carolina hill  country.   Thurmond Chatham is  said 
to be proud of the great degree of communication between 
the company management and the workers and seeks to keep it 
that way with hospital and  medical care  insurance,  a cor.pany 
retirement plan supplementing Social Security benefits, a 
group indurance scheme,  a full-time inter-departmental 
recreation plan,  a company paper,  paid vacations, a credit 
union operated by employees, and a group insurance plan. 
Chatham has donated  the  Gilvin  Roth Yt'CA as a  gift to  the 
community and has "been instrumental in constructing a com- 
87 nnraity hospital.   ' 
These gifts of Chatham and others in the same vein 
prompted the Textile Workers Union 0f America to charge that 
the Chatham family through its handsome donations  controls 
the churches  in Elkin,   that  it controls  the hospital and 
has veto power over who can practice in it,  that the only 
library in Elkin"is  on mill property,   in the Gilvin Roth 
-•CA, that his "man" operated the community newspaper, and 
that the Elkin police force is also hired to guard the mill 
CO 
property.      in 1951 when TWA organizers wished to hold a 
public meeting for the Chatham workers,   the  only available 
8?Chester s- Davis,  "Design for Industrial Living: 
Chatham at Elkin," Winston-Salem Journal-Sentinel.  May 30,   19*W, 
Section III    T>.  1. 
38„ 
Textile Labor," December, 1956, p. 3» 
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meeting place was the auditorium in the school in Austin 
fifteen miles away;  the use of that auditorium was  later 
denied the TWUA because  the Chatham  family contributed to 
the school lunch program,  and the Austin princiual  felt that 
he was forced  to make a choice  between  the TWUA and his 
pupils1 wellbeing, a choice which inevitable favored the 
Chathans.0    Further,   in 195^,  when an National Labor Re- 
lations Board election was being held in Elkin to deter- 
mine representation for the Chatham workers,   the company 
tactics of repression had the spoken blessing of the mayor, 
• the banker, the professional perople, and the merchants 
(who abruptly cut off credit and  called in loans).90 A 
minister,  the Rev.   George D.  Heaton,  was imported from Char- 
lotte to supplement  the local clergy in their broadcasting 
attacks on unionism,  and  in holding  "prayer meetings" on 
company time on election  eve during the course of which the 
union was denounced as "anti-Christ"."    Needless to say, the 
TWUA petitioned the  National Labor Relations Board  to dis- 
regard the results of the election which went against the 
;nion (1,730 to 1, 189).92 
The example  of Kannapolis,   the  "largest unincorporated 
town in the world", and kept that was nrecisely because this 
t.i%,      -> 
89„ 
90 
Textile Labor," February,  1961, p.  5. 
Ibid.,   December,  1956,   p.  ^. 
91 
92 
Ibid., December, 1956, p. 5« 
Ibid., April, 1955, p. 20. 
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fact of unincorporation with its trappings of utter de- 
pendence for utilities and police protection    upon the 
Cannon family makes the town easily manageable, is equally 
as illustrative  of paternalism as is Elkin.   The  bulk of 
Dolice department salaries is paid by Cannon Kills,  and a 
majority of the police officers live in houses owned by 
the mills.  There are no city taxes;   so water and  sewer 
systems,  electricity,  and  the public  recreation system are 
provided by the Cannon Mills Corporation.  Further, Charles 
A. Cannon was until very recently chairman of the board, of 
the Cabarrus Bank and chairman of the hospital board,  and 
his son-in-law was principal stockholder in the town's only 
newsmner which is housed in a Cannon-owned building.  Cannon 
is the undoubted boss of Cabarrus Coujty politics, though 
there is quiet resentment of the power he possesses.93 
In 1951 when the TWUA tried  to use  the Kannapolis 
radio station dGTL which is controlled by a member-by-mar- 
riape of the Cannon clan its request was first refused 
and then when the Federal Communications Commission after 
TWUA petitioning  opened  the  station for its use,   the T//UA 
was required to submit  taped programs whichflso altered by 
thb station management that the union was,  in effect,  choked 
off the air.9l+ So firm was the Cannon grip  on its mills that 
the TWUA after preparing for elections in five plants in 
the chain in the spring of 1958 withdrew in all five cases 
93chester S. Davis,  "Kannapolis: A Kingdom of the 
Cannons," //inston-Salem Journal-Sentinel. August 16,  19?9, 
Action C, p. 1. 
9k"Textile Labor," February,  1961,  p.  ?• 
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because it feared that if it failed to win all five elec- 
tions those plants which favored the union might be closed.95 
The pattern of Burlington Industries in opposition 
to union penetration has been confined largely to threats 
of closing down plants if the union moves in.  Such threats 
as "If the union comes in here we will move to Nova Scotia" 
and "If we can't dye goods cheap down here we will move to 
96 Japan"     are-not idle ones;  Burlington is commonly known 
to have a lengthy history of closing down plants were 
the unions are formed.   In addition ,  Burlington has at 
various times announced significant wage increases almost 
simultaneously with TWUA announcements of organizing cam- 
paigns. For the millhand who is quite naturally concerned 
with take-home pay it is not difficult to choose  between the 
uncertainty and possible defeat of union organizing and the 
certainty of a Burlington wage increase. 
Cone Mills,   so  far as  the TtfUA is concerned,  has a 
much better record    than does the neighboring Burlington 
Industries.  In Cone Mills most of the supervisors and super- 
intendents have worked their way up through the ranks;  the 
road to at least some vestige of the Horatio Alger story is 
97 
open.     Cone Mills officials,  though regarded as  shrewd 
operators by union officials, were said to be easier to 
'-ieal sensibly with than any other textile group of comparable 
^Warner Boomberg, Jr., Joel Seidman, Victor Hoff- 
"■an,  "New Mambers—New Goals," The  New Republic.  Vol.   14-1 
(July 6,  1959),  p.   10. 
"Textile Labor,"  September,  1956,   p.  1©. 
Cone Mills Corporation,   "The Story of Cone Denim," 
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98 size in the South. 
One of the most tragic and unnecessary stories 
in the annals of Southern textile labor disputes is that 
of Harriet Henderson.   The  story is an unnecessary one  because 
the plants had been unionized and the 1958-1959 violence 
broke out after an arbitration clause on the contract 
books since 19^ was  objected to by the mill president 
John D. Cooper.when the contract was reviewed for renewal 
99 in 1958—for no clearly  stated  reason.       The  strike was of 
tragic proportions because here stood a man with whom the 
union had dealt fairly amicably for  fourteen years and had 
held up as a  fine  example of employer cooperation with the 
union, yet who refused to allow a  fourteen-year-old arbi- 
tration clause  in the  new contract.  The  strike was  tragic, 
too, because of the implications  of pressure from other 
manufacturers on Cooper to disavow the union,  though he 
denied those  implications and  insisted  that he acted  of 
his own volition and   because he had  got tired  of seeing his 
power slip through his fingers.    (' In its broader impli- 
cations the Harriet Henderson affair raised grave questions: 
was this the  opening wedge of the   solidification of an 
already "hard"  employer line;  had union demands outstrip- 
ped union capability to realize those demands;  were civil 
authorities  still to be counted in  on the  side of the  em- 
(Greensboro,  Nortja Carolina:   (no date)), p.  2. 
9 Greensboro Daily News .  December 11, 1955 (no page) 
"New York Times,   February 26,   1959,   p.   2k. 
100A.H.  Raskin in Hew. York Times.  June 25,   1961,  p.   58. 
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ployer? And yet there were signs of encouragement:  the 
Harriet Henderson strikers remained firm in their deter- 
mination until the hopeless picketing ^as finally called 
off; other TWUA locals responded generously with donations 
of food, clothing,  and money for the strikers. 
The actual conduct of the strike was fraught with 
violence on both sides.   State troops and finally National 
Guardsmen were stationed at the mill gates and patrolled 
the town.  Strikebreakers were brought in from surrounding 
towns, and a Vance County version of the I'ohawk Valley 
Poraula citizens' committee policed the town. 
Efforts at mediation by both federal and  state 
officials  (including North Carolina Governor Luther H. 
Hodges) failed to end the strike which dragged on for 
two and one-half years until late May,  1961, costing 
thousands of dollars and the good name of Henderson 
as the "Friendly City".101 
In the final analysis,  it tras the conviction of 
eight r.en including Boyd Payton, TWUA Southern director, 
of charges  of conspiracy to dynamite mill installations, 
which brought the strike to an end.  Payton and the other 
seven convicted men were all paroled  by Governor Terry 
l0lAll references to Harriet Henderson are from the 
*££ ^ork Tirr.es T   1959-1961 
102, Douglas Cater, "Labor's Long Trial in Henderson, 
"•C.," Reporter. Vol. 25 (September l*f, 1961), p. 37. 
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Sanford by August,  1961,   but bitterness  remained then 
and still remains among  the families of  the  strikers. 
In Harriet Henderson,  North Carolina and the  South 
had seen the horror of labor strife.   Families had been dis- 
r nted;  the business  of  the  sleepy little town had  been 
seriously hurt;  violence had  flared   time and time again. 
The real question of the future  of textile  unionis::. in the 
South was at stake,  for here was a long-unionized mill 
torn by the most elementary of labor struggles.  Here again 
were taught the lessons which had been first explained in 
the northern industrial struggles;  even with the passage 
of time and a  Southern  setting they were unpalatable. 
Harriet Henderson raised  grave questions  for the 
TWUA, not the least of which was  the question of the future 
of textile unionism in the South. That question appeared 
ultimately to leave all hope for positive answer on the 
shoulders  of the textile worker himself.  The union had  been 
served notice  by John D.  Cooper  that no amicability might be 
expected from the employers. The attitude of the community 
of Henderson was reminiscent of that of other Southern 
communities;  the Vance County Committee for Law and Order 
had too much in common with its  relatives in Gastonia and 
Marion to encourage the TWUA. The attitude of the North 
Carolina authorities in sternly prosecuting Payton and 
his followers with flimsy, controversial evidence hearkened 
back to the days of the Gastonia trial and even to the 
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Haymarket Affair and  the Debs case in the Pullman Strike. 
After Harriet Henderson the cotton mill worker was 
truly the man in the  center,   and  it was a much more compli- 
cated center than it  had been in the  'twenties and  'thir- 
ties, for since the Second World War the prospect of a 
living wage was certain without unionism.   Had  the millhand 
been enough  touched  by what he had heard of unionism to 
choose that course instead of the easier ones of Turling- 
ton Industries'  high wages and Cannon's and Chatham's 
"family  systems".  Or was the union still necessary? 
Even if the union were  still necessary, most  of 
its veaoons  had  been   blunted  by Taft-Hartley,   and  those 
which remained were  rendered  less than completely  fool- 
proof because the federal  government and the  state govern- 
ments had long  since   eliminated  the most glaring inequities 
in the physical and economic condition of the worker. Child 
labor was eliminated; hours and %feges were regulated;  un- 
employment compensation softened  the erratic  processes of 
the textile industry. The union had now to appeal to the 
psychological inferiority of the worker—and, as one wag 
put it,   "Since TV,  the union can't  »et the millhands  out 
of the house after dark."  Add  to fH» union's  inability to 
act with its  former force and  freedom  the fact of giant 
textile combines that could withstand the incursions of the 
union in one plant simply by closing it down and shifting 
production to any one  of dozens  of others.and  the fact of 
-52- 
vage raises in non-union plants above the level of union 
demands,  and  the  tableau is virtually complete. 
And still the worker was the man in the middle. The 
union with its  hands  tied  by Taft-Hartley and  the recal- 
citrance cf the National Labor Relations Board   on the  one   ■ 
hand and  bv the visible  evidences  of employer  strength and 
the memory of bitter defeats  on  the other,   could  do little 
to go to the worker (at least, not in the way it once had). 
Now, after initial moves on the part of the T-.TFA, the 
worker had to come to the union. u 
Thus,  the  future of unionism lay firmly in the 
hands of the textile worker who,  if he were willing to 
forego community acceptance  (.iow long had  it been since 
he was really accepted off the mill hill—if he had ever 
been?)  and to assume the burden  of repudiation,  could have 
the union—but was the union now necessary to him? The 
answer to the final question lies deep in the psyche of 
the worker.  The textile  operative  in North Carolina has  seen 
most cf his gains come from the government—wage increases, 
decreases in houss of work,  sanitation improvements. The 
Southern worker has,   indeed,   benefited  from  the unrest of 
his Yankee brothers which led to government  intervention 
and regulation more than from his own attempts to amelio- 
rate conditions.  Too little  for  the good of unionism    has 
the union, at least in the ayes of the Southern millhand 
large d- 
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been responsible  for his  good fortune. 
If the worker can look  behind  the facade, he may- 
be able to resurrect unionism,  but that probability becomes 
increasingly remote with the passage of time and with the 
progressively better economic condition of the worker. 
Neither does the worker's traditional restraint from 
collective action unless pushed  to the wall bode well for 
the future of unionism. 
Thus the progress cf textile unionism appears to 
have reached an impasse  in North Carolina.   The reluctance 
of the worker to engage in collective activity and to make 
of himself and  his  fellows a true proletarian class  has 
aided in the creation of this stalemate.   In their re- 
lentless opposition to unionism,  the Southern operators 
have minimized  its  chances for  success.   The increasing 
size and  complexity of  the textile  establishments pro- 
hibits much of the old freedom of access of the union 
agents to all the workers of one plant,  thus lessening 
the influence of any campaign for members.  By the In- 
ability of communities to adjust to the workers' organi- 
zations as realities of Southern life, by Taft-Hartley 
and other governmental curbs  on  labor union extension, 
and by the seeming incapacity of the labor unions to 
change their tactics to relate to these other changes, 
the impasse in unionism is defined.    Whether the barri- 
cade is to be a lasting one depends to large degree on 
the government, the labor union,  and the millhand. 
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